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Abstract
This paper suggests a motive for bank mergers that goes beyond alleged and typically un-
veriﬁable scale economies: preemptive resolution of banks’ ﬁnancial distress. Such ”distress
mergers” can be a signiﬁcant motivation for mergers because they can foster reorganiza-
tions, realize diversiﬁcation gains, and avoid public attention. However, since none of these
potential beneﬁts comes without a cost, the overall assessment of distress mergers is unclear.
We conduct an empirical analysis to provide evidence on consequences of distress mergers.
The analysis is based on comprehensive data from Germany’s savings and cooperatives
banks sectors over the period 1993 to 2001. During this period both sectors faced signiﬁcant
structural problems and superordinate institutions (associations) presumably have engaged
in coordinated actions to manage distress mergers. The data comprise 3640 banks and 1484
mergers.
Our results suggest that bank mergers as a means of preemptive distress resolution have
moderate costs in terms of the economic impact on performance. We do ﬁnd strong evidence
consistent with diversiﬁcation gains. Thus, distress mergers seem to have beneﬁts without
aﬀecting systemic stability adversely.
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Banking sectors around the world have been facing a strong consolidation
wave since the early 90’s. Many explanations for this phenomenon have been
analyzed in the literature, with surprisingly little success. 1 One explanation
that has received only little attention is the association between bank merg-
ers and ﬁnancial distress. Yet, ﬁnancial status and a bank’s merger involve-
ment are systematically related. For example, 1484 mergers occurred within
the cooperatives and savings banks sectors in Germany (representing 95% of
all German mergers, from 1993-2001). One quarter of these mergers involved
banks that were likely in ﬁnancial distress, as we will show below. 2 This is
a surprising pattern simply because it is not obvious that ﬁnancially sound
banks are interested in merging with distressed banks.
One possible explanation is that certain institutions have enforced these
mergers as a preemptive measure to ensure systemic stability of the banking
system (or single sectors). Since maintaining systemic stability is the primary
objective of banking regulation, the regulators are a prime candidate for such
an institution. 3 There is indeed anecdotal evidence suggesting that regulators
foster bank mergers to resolve ﬁnancial distress of banks. Furthermore, in some
countries legal provisions explicitly provide for mergers if banks are troubled.
For example, the FDIC Improvement Act in the U.S. requires supervisors
to prompt a merger (or the infusion of capital) if banks are ”signiﬁcantly
undercapitalized” (see Jones and King (1995)). The obvious beneﬁt of such
an approach is that it may reduce the likelihood that a bank actually fails,
which avoids spill-over eﬀects and the associated risk of a bank-run.
This explanation raises two questions: First, to what extent do forced merg-
ers to resolve ﬁnancial distress of banks (henceforth: distress mergers) actually
exist? Second, if distress mergers exist, what are the associated consequences?
This paper makes an initial attempt to learn about these issues. We confront
the second question of which consequences are associated with bank mergers
as a means of preemptive distress resolution. We address the question empir-
1 Parties involved in bank mergers often emphasize expected scale economies as the moti-
vation. However, most empirical studies fail to ﬁnd corresponding evidence (for an overview
see Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999)).
2 Financial distress is deﬁned as banks with a critically high likelihood of default, including
actual default.
3 Banking crises are costly. For example, a recent cross-country study by Hoggarth, Reis,
and Saporta (2002) estimates direct resolution costs (e.g. expenditures for bank recapitali-
sation, payments to depositors, and so forth) to be 4.5 % of annual GDP on average. Their
estimate of indirect costs (i.e., welfare losses that arise from opportunity costs due to the
crises) is even higher with about 15% of annual GDP.
1ically by using a large sample of bank mergers from Germany. German data
is suitable because the institutional framework allows us to assume that dis-
tress mergers did indeed occur. The two largest sectors of the German banking
system (comprising savings banks and cooperatives banks) have superordinate
institutions, the so-called associations. Associations exert supervision of banks
belonging to their sector, and it is widely accepted in Germany that they en-
courage troubled banks to merge. We do not intend to test this assumption
rigorously. However, the mere facts that i) no bank failure has occurred in ei-
ther the savings banks or cooperatives banks sector over the last decades and
ii) a large number of ﬁnancially distressed banks was involved in mergers, are
suggestive. 4 Furthermore, as we will show below, a German bank’s likelihood
of being involved in a merger is systematically related to its ﬁnancial status.
Hence, the German experience probably allows to observe distress mergers
directly.
The underlying rationale for distress mergers is simple: as a remedy to ﬁ-
nancial distress, one may want to merge a ”bad” bank with another bank
to lower the risk that a default occurs and to increase the eﬃciency of the
”bad” bank through a reorganization. A merger can decrease default risk be-
cause of the additional equity that buﬀers losses of the stricken bank (capital
infusion). This would imply to merge the ”bad” bank with a ”good” bank.
However, default risk can also decrease if two ”bad” banks merge because of a
diversiﬁcation eﬀect that reduces credit risk. 5 The reorganization might also
lead to an enhanced quality structure of the loan portfolio (e.g. by eliminating
risk clusters) and to better risk management by the ”bad” bank.
Yet, it is neither obvious that distress mergers are an eﬃcient means of
distress resolution, nor that they are eﬀective. They might be associated with
higher deadweight costs than alternative means of resolution (like a liquida-
tion), 6 and the reorganization might fail. Moreover, as emphasized by Shih
(1999), diversiﬁcation can exacerbate rather than decrease default risk of a
merged bank, beyond the default risk of the separate banks.
Overall, consequences of distress mergers are unclear and ultimately an
empirical question. The conjecture that mergers are driven by managed pre-
4 We will provide further anecdotal evidence in Section 2.
5 Diversiﬁcation might also aﬀect operational and other business risks, but we believe that
in the context of regulatory intervention and small banks the credit risk eﬀect is pivotal.
6 The corporate ﬁnance literature strongly advocates that a ﬁrm internal restructuring
can be ineﬃcient due to managerial discretion, agency problems, and incomplete contracts.
Some authors even argue that these problems are more pronounced in banking because of
an allegedly weaker degree of control over management in general (see Berger, Demsetz,
and Strahan (1999)).
2emptive corrective actions has several testable empirical implications: i) The
worse ﬁnancial status of a bank (i.e., the higher the default risk) the more likely
should be its involvement in a merger. ii) A credit portfolio enhancement is
to be expected, either as a credit risk diversiﬁcation or a quality enhancement
in conjunction with a change in the risk-taking policy. In principle, any such
eﬀect should be stronger for those mergers where distressed banks are involved
than for ”normal” mergers. 7 iii) If the reorganization of ineﬃcient business
operations works out, there should be eﬃciency gains from distress mergers
beyond those of ”normal” mergers.
Our empirical analysis provides direct tests of these implications. 8 The
analysis is based on the period 1993-2001 and uses comprehensive German
data on 3640 banks and 1484 mergers. 9 We ﬁnd that a bad ﬁnancial status
systematically increases the likelihood of a bank to be involved in a merger.
This is a necessary condition for distress mergers to exist. Further, we ﬁnd ev-
idence that loan loss provisions decrease tremendously for several years after
a distress merger. There is only a temporary decrease in proﬁtability and no
apparent change in the structure of the credit portfolio. Hence, these ﬁndings
are consistent with diversiﬁcation gains by distress mergers. We ﬁnd no sus-
tained enhancement in cost eﬃciency relative to non-distress mergers. Overall,
distress mergers seem to have beneﬁts without aﬀecting systemic stability ad-
versely.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide
a brief overview over the German banking system and anecdotal evidence
regarding bank mergers as a means to resolve ﬁnancial distress. Section 3
describes our data, discusses proxies to identify potentially distressed banks,
and relates these indicators to the incidence of mergers. Section 4 examines
the consequences of distress mergers. Section 5 discusses policy implications
of our evidence and concludes.
7 Penas and Unal (2004) and Benston, Hunter, and Wall (1995) are concerned with diversi-
ﬁcation but focus on large banks. They argue that bank mergers might be motivated by an
attempt of becoming ”too big to fail”. The argument is not likely to hold for either savings
banks, which are state-guaranteed, or very small cooperative banks in Germany.
8 We like to emphasize that the third aspect of eﬃciency gains due to the reorganization
is only of second order importance in the context of our analysis. The focus is on ﬁnancial
status and default risk.
9 Note that the analysis of savings and cooperatives banks is interesting in general since
thrift institutions and cooperative banks represent a signiﬁcant fraction of banking markets
in many countries (e.g. in the United States and many European countries like Germany,
France, Spain etc.).
32 The German Experience
Only anecdotal evidence exists that regulators encourage distress merg-
ers. However, Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1993) provide some evidence that
regulatory agencies are reluctant to resolve bank failures by straight liquida-
tion. 10 James (1991) analyzes the costs of bank failures in the US during the
savings and loans crises in the 80’s. He ﬁnds that ”whole bank” purchase and
assumption transactions (which are fairly similar to a bank merger) impose
the lowest losses realized in bank failures. James’ analysis diﬀers in one major
point from ours. We focus on preemptive corrective actions and are, therefore,
not primarily concerned with banks that actually failed.
We refrain from providing a complete review of the vast amount of empirical
studies that consider consequences of bank mergers and refer instead to the
survey by Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999). We are not aware, however,
of any study addressing distress mergers, or any study that compares bank
mergers where only ﬁnancially sound banks are involved to mergers where
troubled banks are involved.
German data is particularly suitable for an analysis of distress mergers for
three reasons: The banking system was subject to severe shocks, numerous
bank mergers occurred, and the institutional framework provides for insti-
tutions with strong incentives and the power to foster and manage distress
mergers. 11
Three major shocks occurred in the 90’s. First, the German central bank
allowed for the ﬁrst time money market funds in 1994. This reduced the avail-
ability of core deposits dramatically and put a lot of pressure on deposit
margins. Second, the process of harmonization and integration of the EU lead
to deregulation and free entry into banking markets within all member states.
Finally, the German economy faced severe downturns in the business cycle,
giving rise to a large bankruptcy wave of small and medium-sized ﬁrms.
These shocks have given rise to structural problems within the German
10 Mailath and Mester (1994) analyze incentive problems faced by the regulator regarding
his decision on whether to close a bank or to choose forbearance. They show that closure
may not be a credible threat in general, which in turn may adversely aﬀect bank risk-taking.
11 In Germany, the Federal Banking Regulatory Oﬃce BAKred has the power by law (i.e.
§46 ”Kreditwesengesetz” KWG) to take distinct measures if a bank is ”in danger” of not
being able to meet its obligations against claimants. In particular, the BAKred is allowed
i) to give directives to the banks’ management, ii) to prohibit speciﬁc transactions (like
granting loans etc.), iii) to dismiss bank managers on short notice, and iv) to install a
supervisor at the bank. Hence, mergers are not an explicit measure. But the regulators are
obviously very powerful, similar to the U.S. and most other countries.
4banking sector, putting several banks in ﬁnancial trouble. In particular the
savings and cooperatives bank sectors, which consist primarily of small banks,
have been hit hardest. Yet, there has been virtually no case of actual bank
failure in Germany over the last decades, and in particular no savings or
cooperative bank failed. 12 However, roughly 1800 bank mergers within the
German banking system occurred from 1992-2001, and 84% of them took place
within the cooperative bank sector. It appears straightforward to conjecture
a relation between bank mergers and ﬁnancial distress in this context. 13
In fact, the German Federal Banking Supervisory Oﬃce (BAKred) discusses
in a recent annual report the merger wave within the German banking sector.
When discussing Germany’s cooperative banks sector, the BAKred relates the
merger wave to ”the ongoing and alarming claims against the sector’s ﬁnancial
insurance facility” (see BAKred (2001), p. 67). Moreover, the BAKred states
explicitly that in the year 2000 four cases of troubled savings banks were
resolved by mergers (BAKred (2001), p. 64).
As outlined before, distress mergers might require an institution to pro-
mote, enforce and manage these mergers, simply because ”good” banks might
not be willing to merge with ”bad” banks. It is likely that the associations of
the savings banks and cooperatives banks sectors have played this role. These
associations provide central services to their members (i.e. all savings banks
and all cooperatives banks, respectively), like joint IT services, marketing, and
consulting. Of more importance is that associations conduct monitoring and
auditing of member banks because they are related to each sector’s private
deposit insurance facility. These private insurance facilities are explicitly ac-
knowledged by German regulation because their intended purpose according to
the statutes is to ensure the continuity of member banks (Institutssicherung).
Hence, the primary objective of insurance facilities in Germany is explicitly
to avoid the failure of banks.
To further illustrate that associations engage in preemptive corrective ac-
tions, it is particularly enlightening to observe that the BAKred states that
the frequent and signiﬁcant claims against the cooperative sector’s insurance
facility served the purpose to ﬁnance risk provisions of these troubled banks
12 Nevertheless, some major and publicly known crises occurred. For example, in 1997
Sparkasse Mannheim and in 2001 Bankgesellschaft Berlin faced severe losses in their credit
portfolios. However, in both cases no suspension of business operations or even a failure to
meet withdrawals occurred. Both crises were resolved ﬁrst by capital infusions and eventu-
ally by mergers.
13 Note that these mergers are not associated with any direct payments. That is, the leader
does not buy the target. As we will discuss below, it is possible, however, that the leader
receives some nonpecuniary or indirect remuneration when merging with a troubled bank.
5(see BAKred (2001), p. 78). Notably, the insurance facility did not compensate
losses of depositors or other claimants because of actual bank failures. Rather,
ﬁnancial support was concerned with expected losses. Clearly, ﬁnancing risk
provisions is a preemptive measure to avoid bank failures. 14
In summary, associations have signiﬁcant inﬂuence on member banks and
strong incentives to act in the collective interest of their whole sector. Fur-
thermore, given the institutional framework and the anecdotal evidence, it
seems very likely that associations have indeed fostered and managed distress
mergers. Therefore, the German ﬁnancial system appears to be an ideal place
to learn about consequences of distress mergers.
3 The Ex ante-Relation between Mergers and Financial Status
3.1 Data
The empirical analysis is based on comprehensive data from the German
savings and cooperatives bank sectors over the period 1993 to 2001. The data
are provided by the German central bank (Deutsche Bundesbank), and consist
of mandatory reports from all licensed banks in Germany. Mandatory reports
are not publicly available and include
• monthly reports of banks regarding balance sheet items and yearly proﬁt
and loss statements (”Bankbilanzstatistik”),
• monthly reports regarding regulatory capital and risk weighted assets ac-
cording to the 1988 Basle Accord, and
• quarterly reports including information on the gross industry structure of
loan portfolios (”Kreditnehmerstatistik”).
The Bundesbank also provided a comprehensive list of all bank mergers
within the German ﬁnancial system from 1992 to 2001. Since data from proﬁt
and loss statements is only available on an annual basis, all tests are conducted
using annual data.
14 A single bank might be interested in exploiting such an implicit insurance scheme via
risk-shifting at the expense of other banks within the same sector. If the bank increases risk
and a bad state realization occurs, the other banks of the sector eﬀectively bear a major
part of the costs, either directly at the bail-out or via the premia they pay to the insurance
facility. However, audits by the associations and the long lasting history of the German
institutional framework render this issue unlikely to have a systematic eﬀect in the context
of our study.
6The sample comprises cooperatives and savings banks only. 15 We exclude
all banks from our sample that are for-proﬁt banks, 16 foreign or specialized
banks (like building and loan associations), or apex institutions of the savings
bank and cooperatives bank sectors. 17 Excluding the for-proﬁt banks and the
apex institutions mitigates problems of bank heterogeneity and ensures that
our analysis of distress mergers is not aﬀected by ”too big to fail” issues. 18
Table 1 provides summary statistics by sectors (Panel A), the type of merger
involvement of the banks (Panel B), and the time of merger (Panel C). As of
December 1992, 3640 banks are included. This number is signiﬁcantly lower at
the end of our observation period. As of December 2001, 1484 mergers reduced
the sample to a total of 2156 banks. Interestingly, there is not a single case of
bank failure (or liquidation) during the observation period.
Table 1 highlights that the majority of mergers occurred within the co-
operatives sector. Panel B diﬀerentiates four types of merger involvement by
banks: Without indicates that the bank was not involved in a merger dur-
ing the period 1992-2001. 19 Target (only) indicates that banks in this group
were involved in a merger once, and ceased to exist afterwards. Leader (only)
indicates that banks in this group were involved in mergers and that their
corporation continued afterwards. 393 out of 937 banks in this group were
repeatedly involved in mergers. Multiple merger involvement occurred also for
the fourth group of banks (Target & Leader), who were ﬁrst leader but became
target in their last merger. 20 out of these 132 banks were also more than once
a leader before becoming target. 20
There are two further characteristics of the sample which are noteworthy
but cannot be seen from the table. First, all mergers in the sample occurred
within the respective sector, i.e. cooperatives banks merge only with coopera-
tives banks. Second, bank mergers generally occurred between banks that are
15 Note that savings bank belong to the state-sector because they are owned by federal
institutions like counties and cities. Cooperatives banks are also non-proﬁt organizations
owned by members who are at the same time customers (i.e. depositors and creditors).
16 These comprise either extremely large banks (like Deutsche Bank) or very specialized
small banks (like Bankhaus Aufh¨ auser & Co.).
17 The apex institutions comprise in particular 12 Landesbanken as well as DZ Bank and
WGZ Bank, which belong to the savings and cooperatives bank sector, respectively.
18 For example, total assets of the largest Landesbank, WestLB, were 432 billions Euro in
2001. In comparison, the average size of a savings banks in the same year was roughly equal
to 1 billion Euros.
19 Our data contains complete merger information for the year 1992, but P&L information
was not available for east German banks in 1992.
20 Note that by deﬁnition a bank can be a target only once.
7Table 1
Frequency Distribution of Banks and Mergers
The table provides descriptive statistics on the sample size and the frequency distribution
and type of mergers. The principal observation period is from 1993 to 2001; the sample
comprises savings and cooperatives banks within the German banking system, excluding
apex institutions. # denotes number of banks. Without indicates that banks in this group
were not involved in a merger during the period 1992-2001; banks in the Target (only)
group were only once involved in a merger and ceased to exist as an corporation, banks
in the Leader (only) group were involved in mergers and always continued as corporation
afterwards; banks in the Leader & Target group ﬁrst were involved in mergers as leader
but were target in their last merger. In Panel B, numbers in brackets indicate number
of banks that were involved in multiple merger events during the observation period. In
Panel C, the number of mergers is reported over the period 1992-2001. Note that much
of the subsequent analysis will exclude 1992.
Panel A: Sample Size and Sector Aﬃliation
Date Savings Cooperatives Sum
1992:12 723 2917 3640
2001:12 537 1619 2156
Panel B: Type of Mergers
Banktype Without Target (only) Leader (only) Leader & Target
Savings 391 181 146 7
Cooperatives 828 1171 791 125
Sum 1219 1352 937 [393] 132 [20]
Panel C: Time Pattern
year 1992 1993 1994 1995
# 216 159 159 106
year 1996 1997 1998 1999
# 100 98 168 237
year 2000 2001
# 259 198
in some geographic proximity. 21
Finally, it is important to stress that the diﬀerentiation between types of
merger involvement is a priori unrelated to any qualitative characteristic of the
underlying bank mergers, besides the criterion of whose name and corporation
continued to exist. Hence, there is no a priori reason to expect that distressed
banks belong speciﬁcally to one of these groups.
21 These characteristics are certainly related to the principle of regional ties that are man-
dated for most savings banks (but which describes the cooperatives structure as well). In
the context of distress mergers, proximity may foster the realization of scale economies
both in terms of technology and information on local markets. It may also allow for closer
monitoring in the case of a reorganization.
83.2 Identiﬁcation of Distressed Banks
Throughout the paper, we base identiﬁcation of troubled banks on loan loss
provisions (standardized by total loans to non-ﬁnancial institutions). Loan
loss provisions are directly linked to credit risk, which is the major source of
business risk of small banks. 22 Furthermore, we know from the statements
of the German regulatory authority BAKred that interventions by sectors’
insurance facilities to support troubled banks mainly consisted of ﬁnancing
loan loss provisions. High loan loss provisions are therefore directly associated
with (expected) default risk and preemptive corrective actions.
We do not identify distressed banks as banks having diﬃculties meeting reg-
ulatory capital requirements for two reasons. First, cross-sectional and time-
series variation of regulatory capital is fairly small and most banks exceed the
8% ratio of regulatory equity to risk weighted assets by far (see Table 3 and
Flannery and Rangan (2002)). Second, if insurance facilities support troubled
banks by ﬁnancing loan loss provisions, regulatory capital will be biased up-
wards in particular for those banks we want to identify. Accordingly, loan loss
provisions appear to be a more suitable measure to identify banks potentially
subject to distress mergers. However, we will use the information on capital re-
quirements (more precisely, risk weighted assets) in the subsequent analysis to
control for banks’ risk-taking behavior. This serves to disentangle risk-taking
and diversiﬁcation eﬀects in the analysis of merger consequences in Section 4.
To identify the group of banks most likely subject to distress mergers, we
construct deciles of loan loss provisions in the cross-section of banks on a yearly
basis. We deﬁne a distressed bank as one which is in the two highest deciles
of loan loss provisions in two subsequent years. This reﬂects persistently high
default risk and provides some robustness against transitory eﬀects due to
random shocks or earnings management. Distress mergers are then deﬁned as
mergers where distressed banks are involved, i.e., where at least one bank had
loan loss provisions in the two highest deciles in the two years preceding the
merger event. 23
German accounting standards grant discretion with respect to loan loss
provisions, since banks are allowed (see §340 f.3 HGB) to specify general and
speciﬁc provisions on loan depreciations, and to cross-net losses and gains be-
22 Although all German banks are eligible to engage in investment banking, most savings
and cooperatives banks do very little.
23 We experimented with variations of this deﬁnition. For example, we deﬁned a distressed
bank as one in the highest decile of loan loss provisions in only one year. These exercises
did not aﬀect our qualitative results, see the discussion in Appendix B.
9tween loan and securities portfolios. Nevertheless, provisions and write-oﬀs on
loans represent the major part of the proﬁt and loss item ”Loan Loss Provi-
sions” simply because of the business structure of savings and cooperatives
banks. Therefore, we believe it to be an unbiased (though possibly lagged)
indicator of default risk.
Jones and King (1995) provide some evidence on the predictive quality of
diﬀerent accounting items and other variables with respect to potential ﬁnan-
cial distress. 24 Their ﬁndings suggest that accounting-based measures do have
a high Type-I error, i.e., tend to categorize banks as well-capitalized (”good”)
if in fact they are distressed. On the other hand, accounting-based indicators
have a fairly low Type-II error. That is, only rarely are banks classiﬁed as
being distressed if in fact they are not. Our analysis of consequences of dis-
tress mergers will be based on the group of banks that are most likely to be
in ﬁnancial distress based on the loan loss provision criterion. Hence, given
the results of Jones and King (1995), if we follow this group of banks and
assess consequences of mergers they are involved in, we can be quite reassured
that these banks were in fact troubled. A potential bias from using such an
accounting-based measure is in the direction of ﬁnding no distress eﬀect.
3.3 Ex Ante Determinants of Mergers
3.3.1 Model Design
Our study is not the ﬁrst that relates bank characteristics to the incidence
of a merger (see for example the survey by Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan
(1999), and the recent study by Focarelli, Panetta, and Salleo (2002)). These
studies generally show that bank performance predicts merger activity, which
is the necessary condition for the distress merger hypothesis. We conduct a
similar analysis to establish that this condition is met in our sample of German
bank mergers as well.
The general approach is to run a regression of a limited dependent variable
indicating a merger on a set of pre-event bank characteristics. The regression
model is described by equation (1),
y = f(Control variables, Eﬃciency, Financial status), (1)
where the dependent variable y is the merger indicator, control variables rep-
resents variables that control for general heterogeneity between banks (and
24 The authors base their analysis on non-public information from US regulators (like for
example CAMEL ratings and the watch lists for troubled banks).
10observations), eﬃciency includes proxies for the eﬃciency of banks to control
for the most frequently mentioned merger motivation, and ﬁnancial status
comprises our primary variables of interest, i.e., proxies for the expected de-
fault risk of banks.
To allow for some ﬂexibility regarding the impact of bank characteristics on
the probability of a merger, we group banks according to their status within
the merger. 25 Hence, we diﬀerentiate whether the bank ”survived” in the
merger (the leader case), or whether its corporation ceased to exist (the target
case). Since there are also banks that were ﬁrst leader before becoming target,
we have to diﬀerentiate three types of merger involvement. Adding the group
of banks not involved in a merger yields the four groups in Table 1, Panel B.
The indicator variable MERGER equals zero if a bank was not involved in
a merger over the observation period, one if a bank was only a target, two
if a bank was only a leader, and three if a bank was ﬁrst a leader and then
a target. Since MERGER is the dependent variable, we have to estimate a
multinomial logit regression.
Control variables are standard measures used in the related literature. Their
construction is described in Table 2. Control variables comprise time dummies
to control for diﬀerent macro-conditions before the merger event, and variables
reﬂecting the business structure of banks. These include the variable SIZE, as
a general proxy for bank heterogeneity, INVESTMENT as a proxy for the
business structure regarding commercial banking versus investment banking
activities, LOANS as a measure of the relative importance of loan provision
in operating business, COREDEPOSITS as a measure of the availability of
non-interest-rate-sensitive core deposits (i.e. savings accounts, time deposits,
and so forth), INTERBANK as a measure of the net ﬁnancing resulting from
interbank transactions, LIQUIDITY as a measure of the liquidity stock of a
bank, and SME as a measure of the share of small ﬁrm ﬁnancing of a banks
credit portfolio, reﬂecting portfolio structure and credit risk. 26
To consider eﬃciency as a merger determinant we use the cost-income ratio,
as is standard in the literature (see e.g. Focarelli, Panetta, and Salleo (2002)).
The corresponding variable is labeled COSTINCOME.
25 Certain characteristics, like proﬁtability, might have diﬀerent impacts on the merger like-
lihood depending on the type of merger involvement. For example, under the distress merger
hypothesis, a higher proﬁtability might increase the probability that a ”good” bank gets
involved in a merger, while for a bad bank exactly the opposite should hold.
26 The respective statistic of the Bundesbank (i.e., ”Kreditnehmerstatistik”) does not ex-
plicitly diﬀerentiate loan or ﬁrm size. Therefore, we rely on loans to a speciﬁc industry that
comprises only small and medium sized businesses (the so-called Handwerk which means
small manufacturers and skilled tradesman).
11Finally, and of primary interest to our analysis of distress mergers, we
include three variables related to the default risk of banks as regressors. The
ﬁrst is the equity ratio EQRATIO, deﬁned as equity over total assets. The sec-
ond is proﬁtability PROFIT, measured as the result from ordinary operations
standardized by total assets (return on assets). The third and key variable re-
garding the ﬁnancial status, LOANLOSS, is loan loss provisions standardized
by loans to nonﬁnancial institutions. As explained above, to identify the group
of banks that are most likely subject to distress mergers, we further construct
the binary variable BAD, which indicates that a bank is in the two highest
deciles of loan loss provisions in two subsequent years.
Table 2 summarizes all mentioned variables and provides details on their
construction. Table 3 provides descriptive statistics, diﬀerentiated for the four
types of merger involvement. The most striking features are that Leaders
(only) are the largest among all groups, and that Targets have the highest
loan loss provisions and the lowest proﬁtability. As a general pattern, leader
& target banks are closer to target only banks for all variables except loan loss
provisions. Overall, these univariate statistics seem to point to the conclusion
that distressed banks are more likely to be in the target group rather than in
the leader group. The next section presents the multivariate analysis.
12Table 2
Deﬁnition of Variables
The table describes deﬁnitions and construction of all variables used in the empirical analyses of this
study. All ratios are measured in percentage points. NFI and FI abbreviate ”nonﬁnancial institutions”
and ”ﬁnancial institutions”, respectively.
Variable Deﬁnition Construction
BAD Indicator for a bank in ﬁnan-
cial distress
Dummy, bank was in the 9th or 10th highest decile
of loan loss provisions in the cross-section of banks in
two subsequent years
REGCAPITAL Regulatory capital according
to 1988 Basle Accord
(regulatory equity) / (risk weighted assets)
COREDEPOSITSAvailability of non-interest-
sensitive reﬁnancing
(savings deposits + time deposits from NFI)/(total
assets)
COSTINCOME Cost-income ratio, eﬃciency
proxy
(total administrative costs) /(revenues)
EQRATIO Equity ratio (Book value equity)/(total assets)
GROWTH Annual growth (total assets (t)-total assets (t-1))/(total assets(t-1))
INTERBANK Net ﬁnancing in the interbank
market
(accounts receivables FI - liabilities FI)/(total assets)
INVESTMENT Relevance of investment bank-
ing versus commercial banking
operations
(fee-based revenues)/(interest-based revenues)
LIQUIDITY Liquid assets (liquid assets)/(total assets)
LOANS Operational relevance of loan
provision
(loans to NFI)/(total assets)
LOANLOSS Loan loss provisions (loan loss provisions)/(loans to NFI)
MERGER Type of merger involvement ”0” if bank was not involved in merger, ”1” if bank
was only target, ”2” if bank was only leader, ”3” if
bank was ﬁrst leader and then target
PROFIT Bank proﬁtability (result from ordinary operations) / (total assets)
RISKASSETS risk weighted assets according
to 1988 Basle Accord
(risk weighted assets) / (total assets)
SIZE Bank size ln(total assets)
SME Small business ﬁnancing in
credit portfolio
(loans to crafts industries)/(total loans to NFI)
13Table 3. Pre-event Descriptive Statistics of Bank Mergers
The table provides descriptive statistics on all variables used in this study. Grouping according to the variable MERGER. For variable deﬁnitions see Table 2. All observations
of banks involved in a merger (i.e., MERGER > 0) are measured in the year preceding the event, i.e. time τ = −1i ne v e n tt i m e .
Type of Merger Without Target (only) Leader (only) Leader and Target
N=10,950 N=1,289 N=1,012 N=169
Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
COREDEPOSITS [%] 9.72 14.70 12.77 17.28 11.33 15.81 13.40 17.30
COSTINCOME [%] 9.89 3.38 11.99 3.91 11.17 3.60 12.64 4.11
EQRATIO [%] 4.45 2.26 4.62 2.29 4.40 1.03 4.49 0.91
GROWTH [%] 5.90 5.79 3.77 7.01 5.32 6.49 2.68 6.10
INVESTMENT [%] 8.71 3.84 10.14 8.39 10.74 4.31 11.77 4.69
LOANS [%] 58.91 11.52 56.05 14.37 59.38 12.81 57.00 12.35
LOANLOSS [%] 0.63 0.65 0.81 1.35 0.73 0.98 0.73 0.85
PROFIT [%] 1.25 0.54 1.01 0.64 1.18 1.04 1.01 0.55
REGCAPITAL [%] 11.13 3.41 11.56 6.20 10.78 2.02 10.87 2.08
SIZE 12.07 1.48 11.15 1.06 12.26 1.04 11.75 0.87
SME [%] 2.73 2.05 2.69 2.15 2.56 2.01 2.20 1.69
1
43.3.2 Multivariate Analysis of Merger Determinants
Before turning to estimation results of the multinomial logit analysis, two
methodological issues have to be addressed: overweighing of banks without
mergers and multiple mergers.
The ex ante analysis is based on variable values in the year preceding the
merger event. The multinomial logit model is estimated for two samples. One
is the full sample of banks. We also rely on state-base sampling to control for
the problem of overweighing banks without merger involvement (which do not
have event dates), as suggested by Manski and McFadden (1981). That is, we
randomly select a sample of 35% of banks from the group of banks without
merger for each year of the observation period (with replacement). Though the
35% fraction is an arbitrary choice, it approximately reﬂects the overall ratio
of banks with and without bank merger and leads thus to a more balanced
sample. 27 In the case of the balanced random sample descriptive statistics are
virtually the same as in Table 3.
Multiple mergers of one bank can lead to overlapping event windows. 28
Therefore, to examine pre-event characteristics that are unaﬀected by preced-
ing mergers, we include in our ex-ante analysis only cases where no merger of
the same bank occurred within two years before the merger. 29 Table 4 shows
estimation results of the multinomial logit regression. We exclude the group
of banks that were leader and target because of the small sample size. Results
are reported only for the balanced random sample. None of the qualitative
results reported in the table depend on these choices.
The coeﬃcients reported in Table 4 are marginal eﬀects at the unconditional
medians of explanatory variables. This serves to overcome the diﬃculties in
interpreting estimated coeﬃcients in multinomial logit models, which reﬂect
changes in odds ratios. 30 The table shows results for the groups of target and
leader banks, such that banks without merger serve as the reference group. 31
We report two models. Model 1 uses loan loss provisions as the key variable
of interest, while Model 2 uses the dummy variable BAD. Since estimation
27 Note that we draw with replacement, such that in the overall sample a bank without
merger may be included more than once because it was chosen in more than one year.
28 If, for example, a given bank has been involved in two mergers, one in 1994 and one
in 1995, there is in fact only one observation reﬂecting pre-event characteristics, i.e. 1993.
Variable values in 1994 would be aﬀected by the merger event in the same year.
29 At the beginning of the observation period, 1993, we can only trace back this criterion
for one year because we don’t know about mergers that occurred in 1991.
30 See the discussion in Greene (2003), chapter 21.
31 Reported values indicate the marginal change in the probability of becoming either target
or leader if the regressor changes its value by a marginal unit, c.p.
15results are similar, we focus the discussion on Model 2. Table 4 reﬂects many
of the stylized facts known from the literature, so that we focus the discussion
on the impact of ﬁnancial status.
All measures related to bank performance signiﬁcantly aﬀect the probability
of being involved in a merger, though signs of eﬀects and signiﬁcance diﬀer be-
tween leaders and targets. A higher book value of equity to assets (EQRATIO)
signiﬁcantly decreases the probability of merger involvement. The coeﬃcient
is negative and signiﬁcant for both leaders and targets. A lower proﬁtability in
terms of return on assets (PROFIT) increases the probability of becoming a
target and decreases the probability of becoming a leader. Finally, if a bank is
in the two highest deciles of loan loss provisions in two subsequent years (BAD
equal to one), the likelihood of becoming a target increases signiﬁcantly. For
the median bank, BAD does not aﬀect the probability of becoming a leader. 32
Taken together, these results suggest that a bad ﬁnancial situation sys-
tematically aﬀects the probability of merger involvement for banks, which is
the necessary condition for the distress merger conjecture. The result from
the univariate analysis is conﬁrmed, that ﬁnancially distressed banks belong
predominantly to the group of target banks.
Further, loan loss provisions contain information not included in proﬁtabil-
ity or the equity ratio. This follows because loan loss provisions are signiﬁcant
in the regressions of Table 4, although we included the two other factors si-
multaneously. 33 Moreover, the economic impact of being in the two highest
deciles of loan loss provisions in two subsequent years (BAD) is signiﬁcant:
The probability of the median ﬁrm to become a target is 11.4%. According
to the marginal eﬀect, this probability increases by 13.1 percentage points to
24.5 % if the bank’s status becomes BAD. 34 Overall, the results justify our
usage of loan loss provisions to identify distressed banks and strongly support
the conjecture that ﬁnancial status is a determinant of bank mergers.
32 This is the only diﬀerence in signiﬁcance between estimated coeﬃcient and marginal
eﬀects, because in terms of the logit coeﬃcient, BAD is signiﬁcantly positive for leaders.
Hence, the odds ratio of becoming a leader instead of being not involved in a merger
increases, the higher loan loss provisions, albeit the change in probability of being a leader
for the median ﬁrm is insigniﬁcant.
33 Unreported joint tests of signiﬁcance for LOANLOSS or BAD over all groups of merger
involvement are highly signiﬁcant.
34 Note that marginal eﬀects in for dummy variables are measured for the discrete change
from 0 to 1.
16Table 4. Ex-ante Analysis of Merger Determinants
The table reports estimates of a multinomial logit regression of the categorical variable MERGER (taking value zero if a bank was not involved in a merger, value one if a
bank was only a target, and value two if a bank was only a leader) on a set of explanatory variables. For deﬁnitions of regressors see Table 2. The table only reports estimates
for two groups where banks actually were involved in mergers, i.e., the case of no merger involvement serves as the reference group. The third group of banks that were leader
and target are excluded. All reported coeﬃcient values represent marginal eﬀects calculated at the unconditional medians of the regressors. Regressors include a constant
and a set of calendar year dummies, but coeﬃcients are omitted. All variables are measured at the time before a merger took place, i.e., at t= -1 in event time. To include an
observation for banks with multiple mergers we require that no merger occurred in the two preceding years. Observation for banks without merger are randomly chosen to
balance the ratio of banks with and without mergers. For each year of the observation period, we randomly select a sample of 35% of banks from the group of banks without
merger. p-values are in parentheses. *, **: signiﬁcance at the 5%-, and 1%-level, respectively.
Model 1 Model 2
Expl. Variables MERGER = 1 MERGER = 2 MERGER = 1 MERGER = 2
(Target only) (Leader only) (Target only) (Leader only)
SIZE -0.168 (0.000)** 0.096 (0.000)** -0.097 (0.000)** 0.154 (0.000)**
LIQUIDITY 0.006 (0.001)** -0.005 (0.026)* 0.003 (0.000)** -0.003 (0.199)
INVESTMENT 0.003 (0.376) 0.015 (0.000)** 0.003 (0.011)* 0.013 (0.000)**
INTERBANK 0.001 (0.309) 0.001 (0.343) 0.002 (0.000)** -0.005 (0.000)**
LOANS 0.001 (0.76) 0.002 (0.026)* 0.001 (0.001)** 0.002 (0.018)*
COREDEPOSITS -0.000 (0.898) -0.004 (0.093) -0.001 (0.456) -0.002 (0.185)
COSTINCOME -0.002 (0.619) 0.016 (0.000)** -0.000 (0.845) 0.018 (0.000)**
EQRATIO -0.032 (0.001)** 0.010 (0.263) -0.016 (0.000)** -0.002 (0.815)
PROFIT -0.103 (0.000)** 0.033 (0.110) -0.048 (0.000)** 0.053 (0.017)**
LOANLOSS 0.088 (0.000)** 0.012 (0.3332) — —
BAD — — 0.1311 (0.000)** 0.027 (0.367)
N 5329 5329
Pseudo-R2 0.114 0.143
LR-test model 0.000 0.000
1
74 Consequences of Distress Mergers
4.1 Methodology
4.1.1 Testable Implications
The results of the preceding section support that a bad ﬁnancial status of
banks increases the likelihood of their merger involvement. This is a necessary
condition for the claim that bank mergers serve to resolve ﬁnancial distress
of banks preemptively (distress mergers) and supports our assumption that
distress mergers are observable in Germany. In this section, we try to exploit
this feature and compare mergers between only ”good” banks and mergers
between ”good” and ”bad” banks. With distress mergers proxied by the latter
group, one should expect to ﬁnd diﬀerences between the two groups in post-
merger performance.
In particular, the primary potential beneﬁt of distress mergers is the credit
portfolio enhancement eﬀect. This may arise along two dimensions. First, one
can purge the credit portfolio from ”bad” characteristics like risk clusters or
low quality borrowers and one can tighten criteria for granting new loans.
This corresponds to a change in the risk-taking policy of the bank. There is
no reason to expect similar eﬀects of credit portfolio enhancement for mergers
between good banks only. Empirically, one should then expect to observe
decreasing loan loss provisions because of the enhancement in the average
borrower quality. It is important to emphasize that under German accounting
rules, loan loss provisions consist of charge-oﬀs on already impaired loans
and provisions for expected losses. The quality enhancement does not aﬀect
actual charge-oﬀs on already troubled loans, but provisions to buﬀer future
expected losses will be lowered. A change in the bank’s risk-taking should also
be reﬂected in lower risk premia charged on loans (lowering proﬁtability) and
a decrease in risk weighted assets.
Second, the merger can simply lead to a diversiﬁcation of credit risk. Here,
loan loss provisions against future defaults will be lower (as a fraction of total
loans) and the volatility of loan loss provisions should decrease. The structure
of the credit portfolio (risk premia and risk weighted assets) should remain
the same, however.
By deﬁnition, only distress mergers are intended to improve ﬁnancial status
of a distressed bank. 35 Hence, there is no reason to expect similar eﬀects of
35 Schrand and Unal (1998) examine thrift conversions to stock charters in the US, and ﬁnd
that these savings banks are even interested in increasing their business risk, though in a
trade-oﬀ with reduced interest rate risk.
18credit portfolio enhancement for mergers between good banks only.
A second implication of managed distress mergers is that they might be
associated with eﬃciency gains in the medium- and long-run. If ﬁnancial dis-
tress is due to ineﬃcient management policies or business operations, and
mergers foster reorganization, eﬃciency gains should be more pronounced for
the group of distress mergers than for normal mergers. However, any merger
of small banks might be due to eﬃciency considerations. 36 The particular
motivation of distress mergers renders eﬃciency gains more likely to occur,
however.
4.1.2 Empirical Design
The ex-post analysis is focused on credit portfolio enhancement and the
eﬃciency issue. To identify mergers where ﬁnancially distressed banks are
involved, we rely on the variable BAD. The results of Section 3 have shown
that these are banks most likely to be subject to preemptive mergers as a
corrective action.
The objective of the ex post analysis is to compare merger impacts for
mergers between good banks (normal mergers) and mergers where bad banks
are involved (distress mergers). This requires an estimate of the merger impact
for both groups. Hence, one has to compare normal mergers to banks not
involved in a merger, and distress mergers to normal mergers. Further, the
objective is inherently dynamic because one wants to compare diversiﬁcation
and eﬃciency before and after the merger.
This is achieved by running an event study-type regression of the variable of
interest on indicator variables for ”normal” mergers and distress mergers. To
diﬀerentiate short-term, medium-term, and long-run eﬀects, the set of dum-
mies is expanded to reﬂect the corresponding post-event periods.
The corresponding regression model is
yit = αi + νt +

j=1,2
λj yi,t−j + βDτ + γ(Dτ BADτ)+ ( 2 )
η1SIZE + η2SIZE
2 +  it
According to equation (2), we regress yit on a set of explanatory variables,
where yi,t−j is a lagged dependent variable, and λ, β, γ, andη are coeﬃcients
to be estimated. The set of dummy variables Dτ indicates merger events
36 Although the apparent lack of evidence on eﬃciency gains in previous studies might
indicate that looking at all mergers is not a suﬃciently focused approach.
19in event time. We consider short-run eﬀects by using a dummy for τ =0 ,
medium-run eﬀects by using a dummy for the time period τ ∈ [1 − 3], and
long-run eﬀects by using a dummy for τ ≥ 4. We further include the interac-
tion terms of the indicator for mergers and the variable BAD, indicating the
involvement of a bank that was in the two highest deciles of loan loss provi-
sions in the two years preceding the event. Hence, Dτ · BAD measures the
diﬀerence of the impact of the merger on y between mergers with and without
involvement of a distressed bank.
The panel speciﬁcation consists of ﬁrm speciﬁc eﬀects αi, and (T-1) cal-
endar year dummies νt. Finally, SIZE and SIZE
2 control for general bank
heterogeneity. 37
The empirical design of equation (2) facilitates a dynamic analysis and
takes four methodological issues into account: i) adjustment processes occur
over time, ii) banks are observed at several points in time, iii) target banks
are not observed after the merger, and balance sheets of the leader reﬂect
both banks afterwards, and iv) the existence of multiple mergers. The ﬁrst
two issues are taken into account by estimating a panel model, which controls
for the fact that the data consists of N individuals (banks) over T periods
of time. Dynamic adjustments to the variables of interest are controlled by
including lagged dependent variables. This is necessary whenever adjustments
to shocks can not be achieved instantaneously. Standard panel models like
the ﬁxed-eﬀects or random-eﬀects model are biased in this case and we apply
the dynamic panel estimator according to Arellano and Bond (1991), a GMM
estimator using instrumental variables techniques.
The inherent problem of mergers is that characteristics of the involved par-
ties can not be observed separately afterwards. One bank corporation ceases
to exist (the target), and accounting information on the leader will reﬂect
both banks after the event. A suitable way to conduct a dynamic analysis of
bank characteristics before and after the merger is to form a portfolio of the
involved banks and estimate whether the event aﬀects the time series devel-
opment of portfolio characteristics. 38 We consolidate the balance sheet data
by backwards aggregation, i.e., adding any pre-event accounting variable of
portfolio banks over time. This procedure results in a single time series for
37 The inclusion of additional control variables does not aﬀect reported results. Other con-
trols like INVESTMENT, LOANS etc. have little explanatory power and deteriorate the
overall model speciﬁcation. Note that through the inclusion of lagged dependent variables
the full history of any determinant of y is included, such that other regressors represent
innovations only, see Greene (2003), p. 307.
38 The post-merger portfolio is automatically reﬂected in the accounting data of the leader
bank, but the pre-event portfolio must be constructed by consolidation of balance sheets.
20each portfolio and is illustrated in Figure 1.
Another complication arises when some banks were ﬁrst leader and eventu-
ally became targets. The issue is illustrated by Figure 1, where four ﬁctitious
banks, A-D, merge over the observation period. According to our terminology,
banks A and D are target banks, while bank C is leader & target, and bank B
is leader. The consolidation of balance sheet data for banks A+B and C+D is
straightforward, the problem is consolidation of bank B. After t=3 in Figure
1, bank B consist of all banks, A-D, while before, accounting data reﬂects
bank A+B, or B alone. Hence, to achieve a consistent time series of the devel-
opment of (say) proﬁtability for bank B, accounting information for all four
banks must be consolidated. The procedure leads eventually to a single time
series incorporating three merger events.
The drawback of this approach is that the merger event between e.g. C+D
is observed with noise because the consolidated data comprises information on
A and B, which were not involved in the merger at t=1. However, an analysis
of B requires a full consolidation over all banks (it comprises all four banks in
the ﬁnal period), and constructing a similar time series for the bank portfolio
C+D would lead to double-counting. We decide to base our analysis only
on fully consolidated time-series over the observation period to avoid double-
counting and accept therefore the increased noise for some merger events.
Note, however, that we do use all available information on mergers and banks,
and that the problem is relevant for a rather small sub-sample of our data only,
because the majority of mergers did not involve leader & target banks. Note
that our results are unaﬀected when excluding multiple mergers, as discussed
in Appendix B.
Fig. 1. Structure of Mergers and Balance Sheet Consolidation
Illustrative example of a series of subsequent mergers that constitute one ”merger port-
folio”. The consolidation of balance sheet data proceeds by backwards aggregation and
summing key items (measured in levels) of all banks that at some point during the obser-
vation period became part of the surviving bank (as of December 2001). In the example,
a single time series from t0 to t4 for Bank B (the leader) results; incorporating three
merger events: D+C in t1,A + Bi nt2,a n dB + Ci nt3.
Bank A
Bank B
Bank C
Bank D
time
t0 t1 t2 t3 t4
Bank A
Bank B
Bank C
Bank D
time
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Finally, Table 5 provides summary statistics of observations in event time
21to illustrate that there is suﬃcient time series information to diﬀerentiate
medium-term and long-run impacts throughout.
Table 5
Sample Distribution in Event Time
The table provides summary statistics on the distribution of observations for consolidated
bank data in event time (τ) used in the ex-post analysis. Dτ·BAD denotes the interaction
term between a dummy indicating a merger event and event time (Dτ), and a dummy
indicating that at least one of the involved banks in the merger was in the 9th or 10th
highest decile of loan loss provisions in the two years preceding the event (BAD).
Panel A: Number of Observations in Event Time
Event time Dt · BAD Banks without
01 m e r g e r
τ ≤− 4 1047 217 —
τ ∈ [−1,−3] 1591 451 —
τ = 0 964 320 —
τ ∈ [1,3] 1939 545 —
τ ≥ 4 1137 222 —
Sum 6678 1755 —
# Banks 742 195 1219
4.2 Dynamic Eﬀects of Distress Mergers
4.2.1 Credit Risk
Table 6 shows estimation results of a dynamic panel regression according
to equation (2). To test the empirical implications of distress mergers, we
use COSTINCOME, PROFIT, RISKASSETS, and LOANLOSS as dependent
variables for which merger impacts are measured. The table reports regressions
for a data set where the upper and lower 0.5% percentiles of the dependent
variables were discarded to increase the robustness against outliers (Panel A).
In Panel B, we do not eliminate outliers but measure the dependent variables
in percentiles (i.e. taking values from 1 to 100) on a yearly basis across all
banks. This methodology is another way to achieve robustness against outliers
used in the literature (see for example Berger (1998) and Focarelli, Panetta,
and Salleo (2002)), and it is our preferred approach, since it uses all available
information. The qualitative results of the regressions do not depend on the
choice of measurement. Finally, for ease of exposition, the table reports co-
eﬃcient estimates for the merger dummies only. Note that lagged dependent
variables and SIZE are always highly signiﬁcant. 39
39 Estimation according to Arellano and Bond (1991) proceeds in taking ﬁrst diﬀerences of
equation (2). Hence, one looses three time series observations per individual: one for taking
22Table 6 provides strong evidence in support of a credit portfolio enhance-
ment eﬀect from distress mergers. Both in Panel A and B, there are signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between normal and distress mergers. For example, in Panel A for
the regression of LOANLOSS, the coeﬃcient on the merger event dummy D0
is positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero with a value of 0.103. Hence,
in the year of the event a signiﬁcant increase in loan loss provisions for normal
mergers occurs (the reference group are banks without mergers). This increase
in provisions remains signiﬁcant over the next three years, since the coeﬃcient
on D[1−3] is also positive and signiﬁcant. There is no eﬀect in the long-run since
for event periods τ ≥ 4 the coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant. 40
Coeﬃcients on the interaction terms of event dummies and the variable
BAD measure the diﬀerence in the merger impact on loan loss provisions for
distress mergers. In Panel A of Table 6, these coeﬃcients are all highly signif-
icant and negative. Hence, the change in loan loss provisions diﬀers between
normal mergers and distress mergers at all post-event periods. The observed
increase for normal mergers in the year of the event is roughly oﬀset (the
coeﬃcient is -0.144 as compared to 0.103, a net eﬀect for distress mergers
of -0.041). The medium-term coeﬃcient for normal merger is positive and
signiﬁcant (0.078). The estimated diﬀerence for distress mergers is a signif-
icant coeﬃcient of -0.165, showing that loan loss provisions decrease in the
three years following a distress mergers on average by 0.087 percentage points
(0.078-0.165) in each period. The long-run eﬀects are even stronger because
loan loss provisions of normal mergers do not diﬀer from banks without merg-
ers (the coeﬃcient of 0.049 is insigniﬁcant). In contrast, the diﬀerence for
distress mergers is a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of -0.268. Hence, loan loss provi-
sions are lower for distress mergers than for normal merger even more than 3
years after the event.
The corresponding coeﬃcients in Panel B show that this decrease in loan
loss provisions of distress mergers is also economically signiﬁcant. For exam-
ple, in the medium-term τ ∈ [1−3], the average net improvement in loan loss
provisions in terms of percentile ranks is equal to 5.3 in each period (the de-
terioration by 3.5 percentiles for normal mergers is oﬀ-set by an improvement
of 8.8 percentiles per post-event year for distress mergers).
ﬁrst diﬀerences and two for the lagged dependent variables.
40 Due to the large sample size, we consider only results on a 5%-level as signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero.
23Table 6. Ex-post Analysis of Distress Mergers
The table reports estimates of a dynamic panel regression
yit = αi + νt +

j=1,2
λj yi,t−j + βDτ + γ(Dτ BAD)+η1SIZE + η2SIZE2 +  it
where yit denotes the variable of interest (LOANLOSS, RISKASSETS, PROFIT, COSTINCOME), ai are bank individual eﬀects, νt are calendar year ﬁxed eﬀects,  it is
the regression error term, and λ, β, γ, andη a r ec o e ﬃ c i e n t st ob ee s t i m a t e d .Dτ denotes a set of dummy variables indicating the occurrence of a merger. The subscript τ
indicates event time. The variable BAD equals one if at least one bank involved in the merger had loan loss provisions in the 9th or 10th decile in the two years before the
merger. For deﬁnition of the other variables see Table 2. The dynamic panel regression is estimated by GMM according to Arellano and Bond (1991). All estimates are based
on the two-step estimator. The last column reports the p-value of a test for serial correlation in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced regression residuals. Consistency of the GMM estimator
requires lack of second-order autocorrelation. Coeﬃcient estimates for the lagged dependent variables and SIZE variables are omitted; they are in every regression highly
signiﬁcant. Panel A reports estimation results based on data adjusted for outliers at the upper and lower 0.5% percentile. In addition, a minimum number of 6 observations
is required after winsorizing. Panel B reports estimation results for the full sample, where the dependent variables are measured in percentiles (i.e. taking values between 1
and 100) in the cross section of all banks on a year-by-year basis. p-values are in parentheses. *, **: signiﬁcance at the 5%-, and 1%-level, respectively.
Dependant Short-term τ = 0 Medium-term τ ∈ [1 − 3] Long-term τ ≥ 4 N Serial Correlation
Normal Distress Normal Distress Normal Distress Lag 2
Mergers Mergers Mergers Mergers Mergers Mergers (p-value)
Panel A: Sample adjusted for outliers
LOANLOSS 0.103** -0.144* 0.078** -0.165* 0.049 -0.268* 11,322 (0.047)*
(0.000) (0.027) (0.002) (0.012) (0.171) (0.020)
RISKASSETS 0.399** -0.899* -0.160 -0.486 -0.204 0.284 11227 (0.085)
(0.006) (0.031) (0.320) (0.156) (0.382) (0.577)
PROFIT -0.039** 0.021 0.048** -0.075** 0.023 -0.048 11,322 (0.650)
(0.000) (0.392) (0.000) (0.003) (0.189) (0.254)
COSTINCOME 0.358** -0.251* -0.282* 0.159 -0.206* 0.209 11,319 (0.092)
(0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (0.215) (0.045) (0.327)
Panel B: Dependent variables measured in percentiles
LOANLOSS 5.609** -11.132** 3.486* -8.775** 2.508 -9.849* 12,936 (0.154)
(0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.004) (0.260) (0.050)
RISKASSETS 2.096** -4.566** -0.197 -0.750 -0.470 -1.514 12,936 (0.341)
(0.000) (0.000) (0.739) (0.462) (0.575) (0.295)
PROFIT -2.974** 4.699* 4.124** -4.276* 2.564 -4.901 12,936 (0.163)
(0.001) (0.025) (0.000) (0.032) (0.073) (0.140)
COSTINCOME 4.087** -3.444** -2.441** 1.015 -2.303* 3.260 12,933 (0.025)*
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.407) (0.024) (0.131)
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44.2.2 Portfolio Structure and Risk Taking
Controlling for the dynamic impacts of mergers on banks’ proﬁtability and
risk-taking behavior allows to assess whether the change in loan loss provisions
is due to diversiﬁcation gains or due to a change in the banks’ risk-taking
policy. The dummy coeﬃcients in the RISKASSETS regression indicate that
the improvements in loan loss provisions are not due to a change in the credit
portfolio structure. RISKASSETS are risk weighted assets according to the
1988 Basle Accord, normalized with total assets. Panel A of Table 6 shows that
mergers have an impact on banks’ risk taking behavior only in the event year.
While for normal mergers an increase in risk weighted assets indicates more
risk-taking (the coeﬃcient is 0.399), this eﬀect is overcompensated for distress
mergers (with a diﬀerence in the impact of -0.899). However, neither normal
nor distress mergers lead to a signiﬁcant change in the credit portfolio structure
in the medium- or long-run. The corresponding coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant
both in Panel A and B. Panel B further shows that the event period eﬀect is
fairly small, equaling a two percentiles increase for normal mergers and a two
percentile decrease for distress mergers.
A similar pattern occurs for proﬁtability. There is an initial decrease in prof-
itability in the event year for both groups, because the event year coeﬃcient
is negative and signiﬁcant (-0.039) and the respective coeﬃcient measuring
the diﬀerence for distress mergers is insigniﬁcant. This eﬀect is compensated
only for normal mergers in the medium term, where proﬁtability is signiﬁ-
cantly positive (and the diﬀerence for distress mergers negatively signiﬁcant
with a similar magnitude of the coeﬃcient). There are no long-run eﬀects on
proﬁtability. Apparently, the risk premia on loans, which are included in prof-
itability do not indicate a systematic decrease in bank risk-taking, which is
consistent with the pattern of the risk weighted assets.
Taken together, these results suggest that the banks do not alter the risk-
iness of their credit portfolio by changing the portfolio structure or reducing
the level of risk-taking. Neither the risk weighted assets seem to change, nor
does a fundamental decrease in proﬁtability occur. Hence, the improvements
in loan loss provisions most likely reﬂect diversiﬁcation gains. A simple test
to substantiate the diversiﬁcation interpretation is to compare the variance of
loan loss provisions before and after the event. One should expect to ﬁnd a
decrease in volatility when comparing the pre- and post-event period in the
case of distress mergers (but not for normal mergers).
Table 7 shows the results from this exercise. For distress mergers the volatil-
ity of loan loss provisions signiﬁcantly decreases after the merger. The opposite
holds for normal mergers. Here, volatility of loan loss provisions signiﬁcantly
25increases after the merger. This provides strong support for the diversiﬁcation
interpretation.
Table 7
Volatility of Loan Loss Provisions Before and After the Event
The table shows a univariate comparison of loan loss provision before and after a merger,
diﬀerentiating between distress and normal mergers. A distress merger occurs if at least
one bank involved in the merger had loan loss provisions in the 9th or 10th decile of loan
loss provisions in the two years preceding the merger. Before uses observations from four
periods preceding the event (τ ∈ [−4,−1]), After uses observations from four periods
following the event (τ ∈ [1,4]). τ denotes event time. Equal Variances shows the p-
values of a Bartlett test (parametric) and a Levene test (non-parametric) of homogenous
variances before and after the event for each type of merger.
Distress Merger Normal Merger
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Before τ ∈ [−4,−1] 1.305 1.320 0.551 0.455
After τ ∈ [1,4] 1.074 0.782 0.795 0.817
Equal Variances (parametric) 0.000 0.000
Equal Variances (non-parametric) 0.015 0.000
4.2.3 Eﬃciency and Robustness
Finally, the regression results for COSTINCOME can be used to test for
diﬀerent merger impacts on cost eﬃciency. 41 With respect to the cost-income
ratio, the dummy for the merger event is positive and signiﬁcant in Panel A
of Table 6. This indicates eﬃciency losses for normal mergers as compared
to banks without merger in the event year. This result is quite intuitive, due
to the transaction and deadweight costs of the conduct of the merger process
itself. In the medium-term, these initial losses are roughly recovered since the
respective coeﬃcient is negative and signiﬁcant. In the long-run, some further
improvements result, since the coeﬃcient on the dummy Dτ≥4 is signiﬁcantly
positive. The eﬀect is small in terms of the economic magnitude with two
percentiles per year.
Distress mergers do not suﬀer from the eﬃciency deterioration in the event
41 There is a large literature analysing the eﬀects of bank mergers on the eﬃciency of
banks. There are three diﬀerent methodologies to measure eﬃciency: The stochastic frontier
approach, non-parametric Data Envelope Analysis (DEA), and the ﬁnancial ratio approach.
There seems to be no agreement which approach is generally superior because they all have
speciﬁc deﬁciencies (for surveys see Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Rhoades (1994)). We
use the ﬁnancial ratio approach (i.e. the cost-income ratio as an eﬃciency proxy) because
it ﬁts well to our overall methodology and does no require to introduce another, completely
diﬀerent methodology. A similar approach is used for example by Focarelli, Panetta, and
Salleo (2002) and Houston, James, and Ryngaert (2001). Also, we’d like to emphasize that
the eﬃciency issue is not at the heart of our analysis.
26period (the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly negative and oﬀsets the eﬀect for nor-
mal mergers). They have a similar positive development in the medium-term
and the long-run because the dummies that measure the diﬀerence to nor-
mal mergers are insigniﬁcant. However, it is noteworthy that our robustness
checks indicate that the long-run eﬃciency eﬀect for normal mergers is not
very robust against changes in the model’s estimation.
To summarize our ﬁndings: The evidence is consistent with strong diver-
siﬁcation gains by distress mergers in contrast to normal mergers. Loan loss
provisions decrease signiﬁcantly in the aftermath of a merger if and only if
a troubled bank is involved. In contrast, a normal merger even results in an
increase of loan loss provisions. Since the risk-taking behavior of the banks
remains rather constant in post-merger years and volatility of loan loss provi-
sions signiﬁcantly decreases for distress mergers, this eﬀect can be interpreted
as a diversiﬁcation gain. We ﬁnd slight improvements in cost eﬃciency, but
the magnitude is moderate and there is no eﬀect for distress mergers that
goes beyond that of normal mergers. Finally, the costs of distress mergers are
a three-year period of lower proﬁtability.
We report an extensive set of robustness tests in Appendix B. First, and
most importantly, we address a potential concern with our test design. The
potential problem is that in the ﬁrst step, we identify distressed banks based
on high loan loss provisions, and then measure the merger impact using again
loan loss provisions. If for example loan loss provisions were mean reverting,
we would potentially measure a technical adjustment rather than a merger
induced economic eﬀect. To address this concern, we perform simulations to
test the size of our test design, i.e., the frequency of rejecting the null hy-
pothesis that there is no merger eﬀect on loan loss provisions, if the null is
in fact true. To this end, we use the sub-sample of banks that have not been
involved in a merger in our observation period and simulate artiﬁcial mergers
by drawing random samples from normal banks and banks that had loan loss
provisions in the 9th or 10th decile in two subsequent years. The details of the
simulation procedure and the results are described in Appendix B. The results
clearly show, however, that banks meeting the BAD criterion and not partic-
ipating in an actual merger do not induce signiﬁcant post-merger changes to
loan loss provisions in our regressions. Hence, we can safely conclude that the
diversiﬁcation results are not driven by any technical adjustment rather than
an eﬀect induced by the distress merger itself.
As further robustness tests, we included RISKASSETS as an explanatory
variable into the loan-loss-regressions to control explicitly for contemporaneous
changes in the credit portfolio structure. Also, we varied the regression models’
27speciﬁcations, using alternative measures for banks’ risk-taking and for the
identiﬁcation of distressed banks. We repeated all regressions but excluded
banks with multiple mergers to control for adverse eﬀects of our balance-sheet
consolidation procedure. We employed diﬀerent estimation techniques to avoid
potential problems of the Arellano/Bond estimator. Finally, we diﬀerentiated
explicitly between savings banks and cooperatives banks by running separate
regressions for each sector. None of these exercises aﬀected our qualitative
results.
5 Conclusions
This paper is concerned with bank mergers as a preemptive measure for
distress resolution. The question we confront is: What consequences are asso-
ciated with such distress mergers?
We address this question empirically by examining bank mergers in Ger-
many. The German ﬁnancial systems features institutions - the associations
of the savings and the cooperatives banks sectors - that are known to foster
bank mergers to resolve ﬁnancial distress. Correspondingly, no actual bank
failure has occurred over the last decade and about one quarter of mergers in
the German cooperatives and savings banks sectors included troubled banks.
We therefore assume that consequences of distress mergers are observable in
Germany. Comparing mergers including only ﬁnancially sound banks to merg-
ers where troubled banks are involved then allows to assess consequences of
distress mergers. These are measured in terms of loan losses (actual charge-oﬀs
and provisions for future losses), risk-taking behavior, and cost eﬃciency.
We ﬁnd that a bad ﬁnancial status systematically increases the likelihood
of a bank being involved in a merger. This is a necessary condition for distress
mergers to exist. Further, we ﬁnd evidence that loan loss provisions decrease
signiﬁcantly after the merger, but only for mergers where troubled banks are
involved. Distress mergers cause some negative eﬀects on proﬁtability in the
medium-term after the merger and no change in risk weighted assets. Hence,
banks’ risk-taking behavior cannot account for the sustained improvement in
loan loss provisions. Also, we do not ﬁnd an enhancement in cost eﬃciency for
distress mergers relative to normal bank mergers.
The ﬁnding with respect to the loan loss provisions has two possible inter-
pretations. The ﬁrst is strong diversiﬁcation beneﬁts as emphasized through-
out most of our discussion. However, there is at least one other explanation
consistent with the evidence. One of the potential caveats to distress mergers
is to ﬁnd a bank that is willing to merge with a stricken bank. Given the
28limitations of our data, we cannot exclude that our ﬁndings of strong im-
provements in loan loss provisions are due to the regulators providing ”good”
banks incentives to merge with bad banks. For example, the banks could have
been granted exceptional accounting ﬂexibility regarding loan loss provisions.
Alternatively, the insurance facility could have bought impaired loans to clean
the books, which are in turn substituted by new, unimpaired loans. Since our
credit portfolio structure variables are rather coarse, this eﬀect may be not
be reﬂected adequately in the data. However, loan loss provisions decrease
signiﬁcantly over a fairly long period of time, i.e., more than 4 years after
the merger event. This renders the ”merger incentive” reasoning at least less
likely.
Given that our results do reﬂect strong diversiﬁcation gains, they poten-
tially have important policy implications. Bank mergers are an oﬃcial instru-
ment of distress resolution of failed and troubled banks under many inter-
national regulations. Our results may provide a justiﬁcation for these rules.
Overall, the costs associated with distress mergers are moderate while diversiﬁ-
cation eﬀects are strong. Hence, from a regulators perspective, distress mergers
at least do not endanger systemic stability. And since they are ”quiet”, i.e.
are conducted without public attention, additional beneﬁts arise from keeping
public faith in the system.
However, it is hard to assess the overall eﬃciency of distress mergers since
we could not directly compare consequences of distress mergers to those of
other means of distress resolution like liquidations. This issue must be left for
future research.
29A The German Banking System
A.1 Overview
Figure A.1 provides a stylized view of the German banking sector. In the
context of the current study, it is important to emphasize the existence of the
”associations” within both the savings and cooperatives bank sectors and to
provide a discussion of the German deposit insurance framework.
The ﬁgure shows that banking supervision is exerted by the Federal Banking
Supervisory Oﬃce (BAKred) 42 and the central bank, Deutsche Bundesbank.
One can diﬀerentiate three sectors: the private, savings, and cooperatives bank
sectors. Private banks are for-proﬁt institutions, comprising large, exchange-
listed banks like Deutsche Bank, and very small and specialized institutions,
as well as foreign banks.
Both the cooperatives and savings banks sector are organized in layers,
where the apex institutions are superordinate, and cooperation follows a prin-
ciple of subsidiarity. Apex institutions (”Landesbanken” for savings banks,
and ”Genossenschaftszentralbanken” for cooperatives banks) provide special
services to the subordinated small savings and cooperatives banks, in terms
of interbank ﬁnancing, FX-transactions, and so forth.
Associations are at the top of sectoral pyramids, providing IT-services,
consulting, strategy coordination, and joint marketing services. Further, they
are engaged in monitoring and auditing of member banks due to their relation
to the private insurance facility.
Nevertheless, each savings and cooperatives bank is an independent corpo-
ration, and general sectoral services (excluding deposit insurance and auditing)
do not necessarily have to be used, though quite generally they are.
A.1.1 Savings Banks
Savings banks belong to the state-sector. Owners include federal states,
counties, and even cities. They are non-proﬁt institutions. Most of them are
not allowed by their statutes to expand their branches beyond the region of
their registered seat (typically county districts). All savings banks are, how-
ever, eligible to provide services to non-inhabitants of their region. There do
42 The oﬃcial name of the banking regulatory agency recently changed from BAKred to
BAFIN (”Bundesanstalt f¨ ur Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht”) when all regulatory authorities
of insurance, banking, and securities were merged into one institution. We keep the old and
internationally more familiar name for simplicity.
30exist few savings banks that are not tied to a particular region, e.g. the Lan-
desbanken or Frankfurter Sparkasse (the third largest savings bank excluding
apex institutions).
The governance structure of savings banks is rather similar to German
commercial banks and industrial ﬁrms. The executive board, Vorstand,r e -
ports to a supervisory board, called Verwaltungsrat. Two-thirds of the seats
of the supervisory board are determined by the founding entity as the owner
of the bank (the municipal entities), one third is elected by the employees (co-
determination). A third body, the credit committee, consists of at least three
members of the supervisory board and is involved in large credit decisions by
the bank. The supervisory board can ordinarily and extraordinarily dismiss
managers.
Since savings banks are state-owned and the legal notions of ”Anstaltslast”
and ”Gew¨ ahrtr¨ agerhaftung” enforce that the owners are liable for all claims
against their bank, there is virtually no loss risk for depositors and creditors
from bank failures. Following a lawsuit ﬁled by German private banks, how-
ever, the European Commission has recently ruled that the unrestricted liabil-
ity of the state-owners leads to a distortion of competition vis-a-vis privately-
owned for-proﬁt banks. Consequently, the Commission forced the German
Government to abandon guarantees for state-sector banks between 2005 and
2015.
A.1.2 Cooperatives Banks
The third group are cooperative banks. These are in principle private banks,
but they are non-proﬁt corporations owned by members that are at the same
time the bank’s customers (i.e. depositors or debtors). Their legal form is
comparable to credit unions in the U.S., despite the fact that becoming a
member does not require a common bond.
Cooperatives banks have three bodies. The executive board, Vorstand,t h e
supervisory board, Aufsichtsrat, and the general owners meeting, Vertreter-
versammlung, where (conditional on a suﬃciently large number of owners)
elected representatives of the owners elect the supervisory board and, for ex-
ample, decide on extraordinary dismissals of members of the executive board.
The supervisory board can dismiss managers and it can suspend them tem-
porarily.
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The ﬁgure provides a sketch of the German banking system, diﬀerentiating the essen-
tial pillars: The Federal Banking Supervisory Oﬃce (BAKred) and the central bank
(Deutsche Bundesbank) conduct supervision. The system can be divided into three sec-
tors: private, cooperatives, and savings banks. The distinguishing feature is that only
banks in the private sector are for-proﬁt banks. Savings-banks are non-proﬁt organiza-
tions which are state-owned. Cooperatives banks are in principle private banks, but they
are non-proﬁt institutions. The cooperatives and savings sector each have a superordinate
association, providing central services (IT, marketing, etc.), and coordinating activities
within the sector. Associations audit and monitor their member banks since they are
related to the sector’s private insurance facility. Each of the two sectors is organized in
layers, where one or more apex institution superordinate the smaller regionally tied coop-
eratives or savings banks. In contrast to the private sector, to some extent even operative
business is shared between the sectors’ layer, following some kind of a secondary liability
principle. This holds in particular for the cooperatives sector. Finally, each of the three
sectors maintains its own private insurance facility. The savings banks and cooperatives
sectors account jointly for about 50% of the German banking market in terms of total
assets.
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A.2 Deposit Insurance
German deposit insurance had never been mandatory until a recent change
in law due to European harmonization. Therefore, each sector (i.e. private,
savings and cooperative banks) invented a private insurance facility. 43
In 1998, a European directive forced the German legislature to enact a
law that established for the ﬁrst time mandatory membership of any bank
in a deposit insurance facility. At the same time a federal deposit insurance
company has been founded. Since each of the private, cooperatives and savings
banks sectors have been relying for many years on their private and unsolicited
43 Cooperatives banks did so in 1937, while the private sector and savings banks followed
in the 60s.
32insurance facilities, the legislator allowed an exemption from the mandatory
membership in the federal insurance if banks are members of a similar private
institution, as long as the stated purpose is to ensure the continuity of the
bank. Note that the exemption is not based on securing claimants rather
securing survival of member banks.
As stated in section 2, the statutes of all insurance facilities explicitly put
the assurance of member continuity as the primary objective. In fact, neither
banks nor depositors have a legal claim on insurance that can be enforced.
However, whenever single bank crises occurred after World War II, all claims
of depositors have been repaid in full.
B Robustness of Results
B.1 Simulation Evidence on the Employed Methodology
One potential problem of our methodology is that in the ﬁrst step, we iden-
tify distressed banks based on high loan loss provisions, and then measure the
merger impact using again loan loss provisions. If for example loan loss provi-
sions were mean reverting, we would possibly measure a technical adjustment
rather than a merger induced economic eﬀect, since loan loss provisions would
tend to decline after being in the highest deciles even without the occurrence
of a merger.
The basic idea of the simulations is that if we artiﬁcially generate mergers
between ”good” and ”bad” banks that actually have never been involved in
mergers, we should not systematically ﬁnd any ”post-merger” eﬀect for loan
loss provisions if our empirical design according to equation 2 is well behaved.
Hence, we should not expect to ﬁnd any systematic merger eﬀect if in fact
no merger occurred. In contrast, if the test design is ﬂawed by some technical
adjustment towards the mean that is picked-up by our post-event dummies,
we should still observe that the post-event dummies are frequently signiﬁcant.
In statistical terminology, this approach corresponds to testing the size of our
test design, i.e., the frequency of rejecting the null hypothesis that there is no
merger eﬀect on loan loss provisions, if the null is in fact true.
The simulations are based on the sub-sample of banks that have never been
involved in a merger in our observation period. We simulate artiﬁcial mergers
by drawing a random sample from normal banks (300 banks as leaders, 240
banks as normal targets) and banks that had loan loss provisions in the 9th
33or 10th decile in two subsequent years (60 banks). 44 We then employ the
same methodology as outlined in Section 4.1, i.e., aggregate annual reports of
”pseudo-merging” banks and run the dynamic panel regressions of model 2.
The size of the methodology is measured by the fraction of 100 such simulation
runs where the estimated coeﬃcients on the merger dummies are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero at the 10%-signiﬁcance level. If the test design is well be-
haved, we should not expect to ﬁnd too many signiﬁcant merger dummies. The
statistical signiﬁcance (one-sided test) of the diﬀerence between the fraction
of random samples rejecting the null of a zero coeﬃcient and the theoretical
value of 10% is determined using the normal approximation to the binomial
distribution. Table B.1 reports the corresponding results. 45
Table B.1
Simulated Evidence on the Size of the Event-Study Methodology
The table shows the frequency of cases where the t-statistic indicated a signiﬁcant coeﬃ-
cient on the merger dummies over 1000 simulation runs. Each random sample of pseudo-
merging banks is drawn from the sub-sample of banks that have not been involved in
actual mergers from 1992-2001. Out of 1219 such banks, 353 banks had loan loss provi-
sions in the 9th or 10th decile in two subsequent years (BAD). For each simulation run,
we draw 300 leader banks and 240 target banks taken from the sub-sample of banks that
never met the BAD criterion. 60 target banks are drawn from the sub-sample of BAD
banks. We then run the dynamic panel regressions according to model 2 with loan loss
provisions as the dependent variable and count the frequency of coeﬃcients signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero (the true null hypothesis) at a 10%-signiﬁcance level. The statistical
diﬀerence between the fraction of random samples rejecting the null and the theoretical
value of 10% is measured by a one-sided test determined using the normal approxima-
tion to the binomial distribution. τ denotes event time, # denotes number of observed
cases, prob denotes probability, p denotes the observed cases divided by the number of
simulation runs.
Coeﬃcient on Dummy t-statistics Signiﬁcance
indicating ... # < 1.645 # > 1.645 Total prob(p<10%)
Merger τ =0 5 8 1 3 1
Merger τ ∈ [1,3] 8 3 11 1
Merger τ ≥ 47 6 1 3 1
Distress Merger τ = 0 26 15 41 1
Distress Merger τ ∈ [1,3] 23 17 40 1
Distress Merger τ ≥ 42 5 3 2 5 7 1
The results shown in the table demonstrate that there is no tendency to
over-reject the null hypothesis of no merger impact for either normal merg-
44 Note that there are 1219 banks without merger involvement from 1992-2001. Out of
these, 353 banks have met the criterion BAD, i.e., had loan loss provisions in the 9th or
10th percentile in two subsequent years.
45 We allow randomly selected mergers to occur only in the years 1993-1998 to ensure a
suﬃcient number of pre- and post event observations. Also, we do not allow for multiple bank
mergers within one random sample. However, random samples are drawn with replacement.
34ers (coeﬃcients denoted by Merger) or distress mergers (coeﬃcients denoted
Distress Merger). Out of 1000 simulation runs, we observe at most 31 false
rejections of the true null hypothesis. Hence, the post-merger dummies are not
aﬀected by any potential mechanic adjustment of loan loss provisions towards
the mean. 46
B.2 Further Robustness Tests
As further robustness tests of our results, we examine how variations in the
model design and the estimation technique aﬀect the results. We also consider
to what extent the results are diﬀerent between the savings banks sector and
the cooperatives banks sector.
Model Design and Estimation
We varied the speciﬁcation of the regression model with regard to the fol-
lowing issues.
• Changes in LOANLOSS: We repeated all regressions and based the indica-
tor variable for distressed banks on deciles of adverse changes in loan loss
provisions.
• Multiple Mergers: We excluded all mergers that contained target&leader
banks to check for the robustness of our consolidation approach.
• Risk Proxy: We used the share of loans to small and medium-sized ﬁrms
(SME) as an alternative proxy for bank credit risk or the loan portfolio
structure.
These exercises did not aﬀect our qualitative results.
Panels A and B of Table B.2 report estimation results from two further
robustness checks. Panel A shows the dummy coeﬃcients for the LOANLOSS
and PROFIT regressions when RISKASSETS is included as an explanatory
variable. Comparing the estimates to those reported in Panel B of Table 6
shows that explicitly controlling for credit risk has virtually no eﬀect on the es-
timated coeﬃcients and their statistical signiﬁcance. Similarly, the unaﬀected
results regarding proﬁtability support the eﬀect is not driven by a change in
banks’ risk-taking. This implies again that the strong reduction of loan loss
provisions for distress mergers is not accommodated by a structural change of
the loan portfolios and therefore probably due to diversiﬁcation.
46 The simulation rather indicates that the test design has a too low type-I error. Unreported
variations of the simulations show that this eﬀect depends on the choice of the instrument
matrix in the GMM procedure and the used dependent variable. We nevertheless prefer to
report simulation results based on the exact model speciﬁcation underlying the results of
Section 4.2.
35One potential problem with the Arellano/Bond-estimation is that the Sargan-
test of over-identifying restrictions always rejects the null hypothesis of no
speciﬁcation error. However, the Sargan-test does not test for a speciﬁc type
of mis-speciﬁcation. Common issues in the context of the Arellano/Bond GMM
estimator are heteroscedasticity and the number of lags of the dependent and
independent variables used as instrumental variables. Since the estimation re-
sults do not diﬀer when using the one-step or the two-step estimator, the
underlying problem is unlikely to be heteroscedasticity.
The number of instruments increases dramatically with the number of time
periods in the Arellano/Bond estimator. It is unclear how much useful infor-
mation is thereby brought to bear on the estimation, since the farther apart
in time the instruments the less information is likely to be present (see Greene
(2003), pp. 307-314). Hence, our results might be aﬀected by the ”weak in-
struments” problem of instrumental variable estimators. 47
To overcome these concerns, we re-estimate equation (2) using either a
ﬁxed eﬀects panel regression including lagged dependent variables or a simple
ﬁxed eﬀects regression where the error term is assumed to follow an AR1-
process. The ﬁxed eﬀects model including lagged dependent variables leads to
potentially biased coeﬃcients. However, the model may nevertheless serve as
a benchmark because for t →∞the model is consistent, and Monte Carlo
simulations show that the bias is often small both in absolute magnitude
and relatively when compared to the adverse impact of weak instruments
on the GMM estimator. The ﬁxed eﬀects model with an AR1-process for
the error term takes only one lag of the dependent variable into account.
However, the potential improvement is that the huge number of potentially
weak instruments is avoided and that the coeﬃcient on the lagged dependent
variable is (implicitly) allowed to vary with the merger eﬀect.
Estimation results are reported in Panel B of Table B.2. 48 The coeﬃcients
on the dummies and the signiﬁcance patterns remain similar to the results
reported in Table 6, Panel B. According to both ﬁxed eﬀects estimators, there
is a strong decrease in loan loss provisions for distress mergers which cannot be
accounted for by changes in banks’ risk-taking. Hence, the evidence strongly
supports diversiﬁcation gains from distress mergers.
47 Experimenting with the lag-structure used as instruments shows that the Sargan-statistic
very much depends on the speciﬁc instruments used, although results for the LOANLOSS
and the RISKASSETS regressions are generally unaﬀected.
48 Dependent variables are measured in percentiles to ensure robustness against outliers.
36Table B.2. Robustness Regressions
The table reports estimates of a dynamic panel regression
yit = αi + νt +

j=1,2
λj yi,t−j + βDτ + γ(Dτ BAD)+η1SIZE + η2SIZE2 +  it
where yit denotes the variable of interest, ai are bank individual eﬀects, νt are calendar year ﬁxed eﬀects,  it is the regression error term, and λ, β, γ, andη are coeﬃcients
to be estimated. Dτ denotes a set of dummy variables indicating the occurrence of a merger. The subscript τ indicates event time. The variable BAD equals one if at least
one bank involved in the merger had loan loss provisions in the 9th or 10th decile in the two years before the merger. For deﬁnition of the other variables see Table 2. All
dependent variables are measured in percentiles (i.e. taking values between 1 and 100) in the cross section of all banks on a year-by-year basis to ensure robustness against
outliers. Panel A shows estimation results based on the dynamic panel estimator according to Arellano and Bond (1991), and includes a control variable for credit risk
(RISKASSESTS) as regressor. Arellano/Bond estimates are based on the two-step estimator. The last column reports the p-value of a test for serial correlation in regression
residuals. Consistency of the Arellano/Bond GMM estimator requires lack of second-order autocorrelation. Panel B shows estimation results for a ﬁxed eﬀects estimator
with lagged dependent variables, and a ﬁxed eﬀects estimation that assumes an AR1-process for the error term (FE with AR1). Panel C reports estimation results using the
Arellano/Bond estimator but diﬀerentiating for the sector aﬃliation of banks. p-values are in parentheses. *, **: signiﬁcance at the 5%-, and 1%-level, respectively.
Type Dependant Short-term τ = 0 Medium-term τ ∈ [1 − 3] Long-term τ ≥ 4 N Serial Correlation
Normal Distress Normal Distress Normal Distress Lag 2
Mergers Mergers Mergers Mergers Mergers Mergers (p-value)
Panel A: RISKASSETS Included as Explanatory Variable
Arellano/Bond LOANLOSS 5.411** -10.261** 3.366* -8.214** 2.754 -10.281* 12,936 (0.410)
(0.000) (0.000) (0.024) (0.007) (0.216) (0.040)
Arellano/Bond PROFIT -3.120** 4.932* 4.007** -3.898* 2.473 -4.994 12,936 (0.231)
(0.001) (0.018) (0.000) (0.050) (0.082) (0.131)
Panel B: Alternative Estimators
Fixed Eﬀects LOANLOSS 5.581** -6.851** 6.239** -13.734** 7.132** -17.433** 15,092 —
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)
Fixed Eﬀects RISKASSETS 1.959** -3.213** 0.578 -1.797* -0.123 -0.734 15,092 —
(0.000) (0.000) (0.100) (0.014) (0.815) (0.488)
FE with AR1 LOANLOSS 5.390** -6.954** 5.972** -13.221** 5.698** -15.867*** 17,248 —
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FE with AR1 RISKASSETS 1.374** -2.120** 1.326** -2.332** 0.500 -0.776 17,248 —
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.405) (0.549)
Panel C: Savings versus Cooperatives Banks
Savings LOANLOSS 2.717 -13.148 7.313 -21.289* 0.801 -19.371 3213 (0.992)
(0.567) (0.153) (0.113) (0.023) (0.900) (0.090)
Cooperatives LOANLOSS 5.625** -10.496** 3.332* -8.138** 3.738 -6.231 9714 (0.507)
(0.000) (0.001) (0.034) (0.013) (0.119) (0.265)
3
7Sector Speciﬁc Results
A ﬁnal robustness test is to diﬀerentiate merger consequences by sector
aﬃliation of banks. As discussed in Section 2, the anecdotal evidence indicates
that the sectoral crises is more severe for cooperatives banks. Also, pooling
savings and cooperatives banks can be problematic because savings banks are
on average larger than cooperatives banks, which might aﬀect the conduct of
business, risk-taking behavior and so on.
Panel C of Table B.2 shows the estimation results according to the Arellano/Bond-
estimator when diﬀerentiating for the sector aﬃliation. The results diﬀer
slightly between savings banks and cooperatives banks. There is no impact of
normal mergers on loan loss provisions of savings banks, but distress mergers
lead to a signiﬁcant decrease in the three years period following the merger.
Normal mergers of cooperatives banks lead to an increase in loan loss pro-
visions in the event year and the three following years. Distress mergers by
cooperatives banks signiﬁcantly decrease loan loss provisions over the same pe-
riod of time. Overall, the patterns are comparable to the results of the pooled
sample. 49
49 An unreported examination of proﬁtability shows that savings banks have a more pro-
nounced decrease in proﬁtability in the three years following the merger. This holds for
mergers where only ﬁnancially sound banks are involved, and for distress mergers. Hence,
savings banks are more likely to reduce risk-taking following any type of merger, since the
proﬁtability pattern corresponds to the pattern of loan loss provisions.
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